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Abstract
In running our increasingly complex business systems, formal risk analyses and risk management
techniques are becoming a more important part of a manager’s tool-kit. Moreover, it is also becoming
apparent that human behaviour is often a root or significant contributing cause of system failure. This
latter observation is not novel; for more than 30 years it has been recognised that the role of human
operations in safety critical systems is so important that they should be explicitly modelled as part of
the risk assessment of plant operations. This has led to the development of a range of methods under
the general heading of human reliability analysis (HRA) to account for the effects of human error in
risk and reliability analysis. The modelling approaches used in HRA, however, tend to be focussed on
easily describable sequential, generally low-level tasks, which are not the main source of systemic
errors. Moreover, they focus on errors rather than the effects of all forms of human behaviour. In this
paper we review and discuss HRA methodologies, arguing that there is a need for considerable further
research and development before they meet the needs of modern risk and reliability analyses and are
able to provide managers with the guidance they need to manage complex systems safely. We provide
some suggestions for how work in this area should develop.
Keywords: Cynefin model of decision contexts; high reliability organisations; human reliability
analysis (HRA); management of risk.
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1. Introduction
Complex systems are never 100% reliable: they fail, sometimes catastrophically, more usually
reparably. Perrow (1984, 1994) has argued that failures are an inevitable consequence of the
increasing complexity of our systems. Whatever the case, inevitable or not, failures undoubtedly
occur. Even in systems that appear to be largely technological rather than human, we find that in the
majority of cases there is a human element involved. Maybe some erroneous or even malicious
behaviour initiates the failure; maybe the human response to some event is insufficient to avoid
system failure; or maybe the original design of the system did not anticipate a potential failure or
unfavourable operating conditions.
Statistics show human error is implicated in (see also Hollnagel 1993):
 over 90% of failures in the nuclear industry (Reason 1990a), see also (United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 2002);
 over 80% of failures in the chemical and petro-chemical industries (Kariuki and Lowe 2007);
 over 75% of marine casualties (Ren et al. 2008);
 over 70% of aviation accidents (Helmreich 2000);
 over 75% of failures in drinking water distribution and hygiene (Wu et al. 2009).
In addition to highly technological industries, there are other complex systems involving
applications of technology in which we include complex mathematical modelling, software
nd web-based systems. The growth of service industries with new business models implies an
even greater dependence of businesses, organisations and even economies on reliable human
interactions. For instance, recently human checks and balances failed to detect dubious
investment behaviour of a trader at Société Générale and led to a loss of some €4.9bn, large
enough to have economic and financial effects beyond the bank. The current ‘credit crunch’
owes not a little to misjudgement and error in the banking and finance sectors, indicating the
growing interdependence of many disparate parts of the modern global economy. It also
owes a lot to a loss of investors’ confidence and trust, both of which inform human
behaviour. These data indicate how vulnerable our systems are, even after many years of
refinement and improvement; and how important an understanding of human behaviour is if
we are to reduce the risk to systems. Another high profile example is the leak in the THORP
plant at Sellafield (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) that was discovered in 2005: see (BNFL,
2005). This relatively modern plant had been designed to a high standard of safety, but
information indicating a system problem was available for some months and yet went unnoticed.
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Despite previous incidents in 1998 and earlier in 2005, the information that should have
suggested a leak, or at least a problem requiring investigation, was misinterpreted. The prevailing
attitude was that the system was error-free and hence information that could suggest the contrary
was ignored or dismissed.
Managerial processes are critical to successful operation of any complex system; and the quality of
management processes depends on their understanding of the import and limitations of the results of
analyses that are provided to them. In this article, we examine current and past approaches to human
reliability analysis (HRA). We discuss its assumptions, limitations and potential in qualitative terms so
that managers can better assess the value of the information that it provides them and so manage risks
more effectively. We also suggest that further development of HRA methodologies should take more
account of the managerial practices that could be applied to reduce the failures that occur at the
interface of human behaviour and technology.
Managers understand human behaviour; good managers understand human behaviour extremely well.
To bring out the best in a team one needs to know how each will respond to a request, an instruction,
an incentive or a sanction. Yet only the most foolhardy and overconfident of managers would claim
that they can predict human behaviour perfectly all the time – or even 95% of the time. The problem
is that we often need to design systems with very high reliabilities, many times with overall failure
rates of less than 1 in 10 million (i.e. 1 in 10-7). To design and analyse such systems we need a deep
understanding of human behaviour in all possible circumstances that may arise in their management
and operation. And that is the challenge facing HRA. Our current understanding of human behaviour
is not sufficiently comprehensive: worse, current HRA methodologies seldom use all the
understanding that we do have.
Of course, there is a trivial mathematical answer to this. If we are to achieve an overall system
reliability of 10-7, we do not need humans to be perfectly reliable. We simply need to know how
reliable they are and then ensure that we arrange and maintain sufficient safety barriers around the
system to ensure that overall system failure probabilities are as low as required. Suppose we construct
seven independent safety barriers perhaps some involving humans, some purely technological and
suppose each has a probability of 1 in 10 of failing, then arranging them (conceptually) in sequence so
that the whole system fails if and only if every one of the seven fails gives an overall probability of
system failure of
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The problem with this is that there are few barriers that are truly independent, most systems offer
opportunities to ‘bypass’ these barriers. Moreover, human behaviour tends to introduce significant
correlations and dependencies which invalidate such calculations, reducing the benefit that each extra
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safety barrier brings; such problems with protective redundancy are well known (for example, Sagan
2004). So the simplistic calculation does not apply, and we shall argue that we have yet to develop
sufficiently complex mathematical modelling techniques to describe human behaviour adequately for
risk and reliability analyses.
In many ways the roles of risk and reliability analysis in general and of HRA in particular are often
misunderstood by system designers, managers and regulators. In a sense they believe in the models
and the resulting numbers too much and fail to recognise the potential for unmodelled and possibly
unanticipated behaviours – physical or human – to lead to overall system breakdown (cf. French and
Niculae 2005). Broadly there are two ways in which such analyses may be used.
 When HRA is incorporated into a summative analysis, its role is to help estimate the overall
failure probabilities in order to support decisions on, e.g., adoption, licensing or maintenance.
Such uses require quantitative modelling of human reliability; and overconfidence in these
models can lead to overconfidence in the estimated probabilities and poor appreciation of the
overall system risks.
 There are also formative uses of HRA in which recognising and roughly ranking the potential for
human error can help improve the design of the system itself and also the organisational
structures and processes by which it is operated. Effective HRA not only complements sound
technical risk analysis of the physical systems, but also helps organisations develop their safety
culture and manage their overall risk. Indeed, arguably it is through this that HRA achieves its
greatest effect.
These uses are not independent – in designing, licensing and managing a system one inevitably
iterates between the two – they do differ, however, fundamentally in philosophy. In summative
analysis the world outside the system in question learns from the outcome of an analysis; in formative
analysis the world inside the system learns from the process of analysis. In summative analysis the
ideal is almost to be able to throw away the process and deal only with the outcome; in formative
analysis the ideal is almost to throw away the outcome and draw only from the process. While we
believe that HRA has a significant potential to be used more in formative ways; we are concerned at
its current ability to fulfil a summative role, providing valid probabilities of sequences of failure
events in which human behaviour plays a significant role. We believe that there is scope for
considerable overconfidence in the summative power of HRA currently and that management,
regulators and society in general need to appreciate this, lest they make poorly founded decisions on
regulating, licensing and managing systems.
The four of us were part of a recent UK EPSRC funded multi-disciplinary project Rethinking Human
Reliability Analysis Methodologies to survey and critique HRA methodologies (Adhikari et al. 2008).
Our purpose in this paper is to draw out the relevant conclusions from this project for the management
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community and, perhaps as well, for our political masters who create the regulatory context in which
complex systems have to operate. Overall we believe that current practices in and uses of HRA are
insufficient for the complexities of modern society. We argue that the summative outputs of risk and
reliability analyses should be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt. But not all our conclusions will
be negative. There is much to be gained from the formative use of HRA to shape management
practices and culture within organisations and society which can lead to better, safer and less risky
operations.
In the next section we briefly survey the historical development underlying concepts of HRA and its
role in risk and reliability analyses. We reflect on the widely quoted Swiss Cheese Model (Reason
1990b), which seeks to offer a qualitative understanding of system failure – though we shall argue that
it may actually lead to systematic misunderstandings! In Section 3 we turn to modern theories of
human behaviour, particularly those related to judgement and decision. A key issue is that HRA
focuses on human errors, whereas many systems failures may arise not just despite, but sometimes
because of fully appropriate and rational behaviour on the part of those involved. Thus we need a
broader understanding of human behaviour than that relating to human error. We also need to
recognise that cultural, organisational, social and other contexts influence behaviour, perhaps
correlating behaviour across a system, thus invalidating assumptions of independence commonly
made in risk and reliability analyses. One of the flaws common to many current HRA methodologies
is that they tend to focus on easily describable, sequential, generally low-level operational tasks. Yet
the human behaviour that is implicated in many system failures may occur in other quite different
contexts, maybe in developing higher level strategy or during the response to an unanticipated
initiating failure event. In recent years there have been many studies of organisational forms which
seem to be more resilient to system failures than might be expected and we discuss such studies of
high reliability organisations (HROs) briefly in Section 4. Another flaw common to many current
HRA methodologies is the lack of specification of the domain of applicability – hence making it
difficult to select appropriate methods for a given problem. Therefore in Section 5, we use Snowden’s
Cynefin classification of decision contexts (Snowden 2002; Snowden and Boone 2007) to categorise
different circumstances in which human behaviour may be involved in system failure. We believe
that the use of Cynefin – or a similar categorisation of decision contexts – can help in delineating
when different HRA methodologies are appropriate. Moreover, it points to areas in which we lack a
really sound, appropriate HRA methodology. Our final two sections draw our discussion to a close,
suggesting that:
 by drawing together current understandings from HRA with other domains of knowledge in
behavioural, management and organisational theories, we can make better formative use of HRA
in designing systems, process and the organisations that run these;
but that:
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 the state of the art in quantitative HRA is too poor to make the summative assessments of risk and
reliability that our regulators assume, and that society urgently needs to recognise this.
2. HRA methodologies and the Swiss cheese model
Reliability analysis and risk analysis are two subjects with a great deal of overlap (Aven 2003; Barlow
and Proschan 1975; Bedford and Cooke 2001; Høyland and Rausand 1994; Melnick and Everitt 2008).
The former is generally narrower in scope and tends to deal with engineered systems subject to
repeated failures and the need for preventative maintenance policies to address these. Key concepts in
reliability engineering include component availability, reliability and maintainability; mean times to,
and between failure; the use of specific fault tree and failure mode tools; and the concepts of system
redundancy. Reliability engineering owes a significant amount to advances in manufacturing
engineering and the desire to improve production quality and optimise output (Lewis 1994). Risk
analysis is a much broader term and tends to deal with more one-off failures that may write-off a
system with concomitant impacts elsewhere. It is not necessarily restricted to technical systems and
has developed into a broad interdisciplinary field with important inputs from the social sciences,
alongside applied mathematics and decision science. But both reliability engineering and risk
analysis are essentially are concerned with anticipating possible failures and assessing their likelihood.
HRA specifically relates to methodologies for anticipating and assessing the effect of those failures
which relate to human action or inaction, and not the failure of some physical component.
There are many reasons why one might undertake a risk or reliability analysis. In broad terms the first
three items in our list relate to formative uses of risk and reliability analysis and the last two to
summative uses2.
1. The designers of a system may be concerned with ‘designing out’ the potential for system failure.
Part of this involves analysing how human behaviour may affect the system in its potential both to
compromise its reliability and to avoid the threat of imminent failure.
2. Sometimes an organisation wants to restructure and change its reporting structures. In such
circumstances, it may wish to understand how its organisational design may affect the reliability
and safety of its systems; and in turn that understanding may inform the development of its
operating practices and safety culture.
3. There may be a need to modify a system in which case there are needs to design the modification
and the project to deliver the modification.
2 We make no claims that this list is exhaustive, just sufficient for our discussion.
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4. During licensing discussions between a government regulator and the system operator there may
be a need to demonstrate that a system meets a safety target. An assessment of the risks arising
from human behaviour will be an integral part of this.
5. There may be a need to choose which of several potential systems to purchase and the risk of
system failure may be a potential differentiator between the options. Such differences may not be
purely technical, since some systems may be more or less at risk from some human behaviours.
As a component of a full risk or reliability analysis, HRA may be used in any of these ways.
The origins of HRA lie in the early probabilistic risk assessments performed as part of the US nuclear
energy development programme in the 1960s (Bedford and Cooke 2001; United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 1975) Early first generation HRA methods such as the Technique for Human
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain and Guttmann 1983) were very similar to those in other areas
of reliability analysis: namely, the probability of a human error is assessed via a simple event tree
analysis. The event tree simply listed an initiating event’, which might be a system error reaching the
human operator, and then considered a series of tasks that which had to be correctly carried out to
prevent unwanted consequences. Essentially, in these early models, the human operator is treated as
another component in the system. Hollnagel (1993) referred to this general approach as
decomposition. A variety of other first generation methods have been developed with broadly similar
features to THERP – the use of task analysis, use of nominal probabilities for task failure, adjustment
factors to take account of different performance conditions, error factors and so on. The Human
Reliability Analysis Event Tree method (HEART) (Williams 1985) is a good example of a method that
aims to use many of the same features but in a simplified setting to give a more straightforward
approach. Recognizing that many tasks have an associated time for completion, the Human Cognitive
Reliability method (HCR) (Hannaman et al. 1984) modelled the time to successful completion. A wider
review of these and many other methods is given in (Kirwan, 1994).
Much of the discussion around these models focussed on the issue that errors of omission (failures to
respond to events appropriately) were considered easier to model than errors of commission, i.e.
inappropriate human actions. However, this simplistic dichotomy now appears too stark in light of our
current, richer, qualitative understandings of human cognition, motivation and decision making,
including the effects of stress, emotion, training, group interactions, organisational structures, cultures
and so forth (Bazerman 2006; Bazerman 1999; French et al. 2009; Kahneman et al. 1982; Kahneman
and Tversky 2000). Research in these fields has shown that there are systematic influences on
decision making and behaviour that cannot be categorised simply as omissions or commissions: see
Section 3 below. Human failure is far more complex than the failure of, say, a steel support beam or a
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hard disk. To be fair, second3 generation HRA methods (Barriere et al. 2000; Hollnagel 1993)
attempted to incorporate contextual effects such as tiredness, stress and organisational culture on an
operator’s proneness to error; and third generation HRA methods (Boring 2007; Mosleh and Chang
2004) have sought to allow for the potential variation in response and recovery actions once an error
chain has begun. Notwithstanding this, we argue that far more development is needed before any
method takes account of all our current understandings of human behaviour.
Surveys of current HRA methodologies may be found in Adhikari et al. (2008), Forrester et al. (2006)
and Hollnagel (1993, 1998). For other recent research and developments in HRA, see the special issue
of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (2008, 21, 225-343). Software reliability
analysis also has a large literature (Courtois et al. 2000; Lyu 2005; Zhang and Pham 2000). Software
engineering is largely an endeavour of human design and thus subject to all the risks that HRA seeks
to explore and assess. To date, software reliability assessment has, by and large, also adopted a
mechanistic or empirical modelling of human error similar in methodology to current quantitative
HRA.
Reason (1990b) offered a metaphor for system failure involving human error likening failure
processes to movements of slices of Swiss cheese relative to each other: see Figure 1. Essentially this
suggested that systems do not fail because of a single failure, but because several elements fail near
simultaneously, as if the holes in slices of Swiss cheese have aligned. Although it is clear from his
writings that Reason knew the limitations of metaphors (Reason 1995, 1997), his readers have often
interpreted the model too mechanistically. There has been a dominant tendency to imagine a fixed
number of slices, sliding backwards and forwards independently of each other until a series of holes
align. In safety studies one talks of the number of safety barriers (the multi-barrier concept) or layers
between normal operation and system failure; and, in a sense, the slices of Swiss Cheese mirror these.
Systems are designed with a set number of safety barriers and these barriers are intended to be
independent: cf. the simplistic calculation of a failure rate of 1 in 107 above. But human behaviour
can correlate the risks of failure of two or more barriers, and most systems also harbour the
opportunity for the ‘bypass’ of these barriers. Human behaviour and propensity to failure varies in
complex ways with, e.g., their tiredness, stress and general emotional state, which may well be
influenced by external events leading to a common cause and which may disrupt several safety
barriers simultaneously. For instance, the Chernobyl Accident (International Atomic Energy Agency
1991; Marples 1997) was in large measure caused by the imperative to conduct an engineering
experiment within a fixed time, leading to stress in the operators and behaviour that compromised
several of the safety barriers simultaneously. Another potential unsafe behaviour is to discover an
3 One should not take too chronological perspective on first, second and third generation HRA methods.
Some of those developed earliest did make attempts to account for contextual effects (Adhikari et al. 2008).
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indication of a ‘hole’ in one layer and to defer
further investigation, relying on the ‘cover’ offered
by other layers: such behaviour occurred during a
recent leak of radioactivity at Sellafield (Adhikari et
al. 2008). Hrudey et al. (2006) describe similar
behaviour during the Walkerton drinking water
tragedy in Ontario, where latent and active flaws left
unaddressed exacerbated the impact of agricultural
run-off infiltrating a town’s shallow groundwater
supply. On the positive side, humans have the ability to recover, to respond to the unexpected, to
think ‘out of the box’, and so on, effectively repairing a compromised layer or even introducing a new
one – the latter is, of course, the principle of preventative risk management.
In terms of the Swiss Cheese model, many of these failings correspond to varying the size of the holes,
perhaps in a correlated fashion, and maybe varying the number of layers over time. Reason himself
discusses similar criticisms (Reason 1995, 1997); but the simpler mechanistic thinking implicit in
Figure 1 still pervades thinking in much of reliability engineering (Perneger 2005). The model
visually emphasises a reductionist approach to HRA and may thus ‘wrong-foot’ the users of reliability
analysis methodologies leading them to miss some of the key factors and mechanisms that should be
built into their models; and, perhaps, put too much trust in the combined effect of several safety
barriers. For example, it could be argued that the model struggles to fully represent the motives that
might accompany deliberate violations of procedure, the creeping loss of vigilance with respect to a
safety culture or the very real opportunities for the bypass of barriers in most technological systems.
We note that there is an established literature stemming from a range of work in France on the need to
moderate reductionist, decomposable approaches to human reliability – or as they sometimes term it,
‘human factors of reliability’ – with an understanding of organisational, management and process
contexts which can introduce dependencies (Fadier 2008; Fadier and Ciccotelli 1999; Fadier and De
la Garza 2006; Leplat 1994).
3. Human behaviour and human error
Human behaviour is complex and often non rational. For instance, it seems sensible to use modern
technological advances to make the physical components of a system safer. But there is some
evidence that making subsystems safer could make the overall system less safe because of the
propensity of humans to take less care personally when a system takes more care (Adams 1988;
Hollnagel 1993). In this section we survey some recent findings from behavioural decision studies
and consider how this area of theory and research can add to HRA. We do not focus on error
behaviours per se, but take a more holistic approach. We do this for three reasons.
Figure 1 Reason's Swiss Cheese model (Reason
1990b)
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First, the error focus of HRA models may be too narrow (Hollnagel 1998, 2000a). Errors are just one
of a range of behavioural products of a number of individual and organisational precursors; they are
not a class of behaviours that are entirely distinct from other behaviours and thus should not be
considered in isolation. In the organisational context, it is often an external system or judgement that
categorises a behaviour as an error rather than the behaviour itself being inherently and indisputably
wrong.
Second, models of HRA that explicitly include human factors typically focus on cognitive aspects of
decision making. Recent developments in the modelling of decision making emphasise the dual
influences of cognition and emotion on decision outcomes (French et al. 2009; Loewenstein et al.
2001; Slovic et al. 2004). The integration of emotions and cognition models of decision making has
improved the ability of such models to understand and predict behaviour (Phelps 2006). Furthermore,
such an integrated approach is highly relevant to the risk-related decision making typically found
within safety critical industries (Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008; Finucane et al. 2000).
Third, the use of high reliability systems designed and engineered to minimise errors and hazards has
both benefits and disadvantages. It is of course important that systems are designed to be as safe as
possible. However, the reliance on such systems can cause biases and flaws in decision making. The
risk thermostat model suggests there is a dynamic interaction between actors’ perceptions and
behaviours and their environment (Adams 1988; Wilde 1982, 1998). People will adjust their
behaviour to be more or less risky, as appropriate for their preferences and their situation, perhaps
relying on one safety system to protect them from the risk of failing to operate another. A high profile
example is the leak in a modern plant at Sellafield mentioned previously. There was a belief that such
a modern plant could not suffer from leaks or other failures. In the context of the ‘new plant’ culture
and other management imperatives, it was too easy to ignore inconclusive but pertinent readings and
observations. It is also noteworthy that this ‘new plant’ culture was implicated in two previous
smaller incidents at Sellafield (Adhikari et al. 2008; Board of Inquiry 2005). Marcus and Nichols
(1999) discuss similar behaviours in which warning signs were not heeded and suggest that other
priorities for limited resources make it too easy to drift towards what they term the ‘safety border’.
Real human judgement and decision making is not as rational and analytic as one might wish. Since
the early 1980s, psychologists have distinguished between two different forms of thinking (Chaiken et
al. 1989)4:
4 There is an unfortunate conflict of terminology here between our use of ‘system’ to mean the entire plant
and processes which is at risk and ‘systems of thinking’ as referred to in the psychological literature. We
use the phrases ‘System 1 (or 2) thinking’ to distinguish the latter.
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 System 1 thinking, often referred to as ‘intuition’ or ‘gut reaction’ that involves a superficial
analysis/interpretation of the relevant information based on much simpler forms of thinking on the
fringes or outside of consciousness;
 System 2 thinking, characterised by conscious analytical thought that involves a detailed
evaluation of a broad range of information, often based on a rule that is assumed to provide the
‘correct’ answer or solution.
While formal risk assessment techniques have the characteristics of System 2 thinking, system
operators may use System 1 thinking in their day-to-day operations and responses to events. For
example, a nuclear power plant is the outcome of considerable complex analysis, research and design,
i.e. System 2 thinking. The operators of such a plant, however, do not typically engage in the same
kind of analytical thinking as the system engineers and designers. The operators’ work comprises
much more routine procedures and, where complex problems are faced, there is potential for operators
to make them more manageable through system 1 heuristics. It has become common to refer to much
of System 1 thinking as involving ‘heuristics and biases’, because of its deviation from the more
rational, analytic System 2 thinking, though that terminology is as pejorative as the constant use of the
term ‘human error’ in HRA which we reject in this article.
There is an extensive literature on decision making heuristics and biases (French et al. 2009;
Kahneman et al. 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Numerous studies have demonstrated the
existence of systematic and robust cognitive biases, and are well summarised by Bazerman (2006).
For example, emotionally-laden or otherwise individually salient information is recalled easily and
likely to be considered as significant to a decision when more objective evidence shows that other
types of information are more important to a decision. The processes that drive such biases have not
arisen without reason – we cannot take into account all the information that surrounds us and so we
need to select information to attend to in order for any action to be taken. The work of Gigerenzer and
colleagues has shown that some heuristics can improve decision making by providing rapid
mechanisms for recall of salient information and execution of choice behaviours (Goldstein and
Gigerenzer 2002). However, such biases can be problematic. For example, Willman et al. (2001) and
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) explored the dislocation between pure financial theories and the
collective and individual behaviours of market traders. Their research showed that biases led to
ineffective decision making and reduced performance.
It is of concern that very little use of this extensive, often empirically based literature has been made
in developing HRA methodologies. Indeed, the mechanistic approach common to many such
methodologies based on fault tree representations of human action assumes that the operators are
using System 2 thinking when in all probability their intuitive responses and actions are guided by
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System 1 thinking (Bargh et al. 1996) 5 . HRA methodologies should model the thinking and
behaviours that are likely to occur rather than more rational, analytic actions and responses that one
should like to think would occur.
In fairness to some current approaches to quantitative HRA, their proponents would not claim to be
modelling actual behaviour, whether it be driven by System 1 or System 2 thinking; nor to be seeking
a ‘correct’ answer to a quantitative problem. When risk analysis is used formatively, its purpose is to
understand better systems and identify the key drivers of risk, rather than chase quantified estimates
per se. Current HRA methods may help identify the key drivers relating to human behaviour,
irrespective of what is going on inside people’s heads and whatever organisational and environment
contexts that surround them. However, such approaches do need data: and while there is generally no
great problem in finding data relating to normal operations, appropriate data are – fortunately! –
sparse in most contexts relating to serious system failures.
If we are to model actual behaviour in a variety of circumstances, then the concept of self-regulation
may be needed. Individual self-regulation is defined as the internal and behavioural adjustments that
function to maintain factors such as cognitions, emotions and performance within acceptable limits
(Lord and Levy 1994). This approach to modelling behaviour proposed that behaviour is goal
orientated and there are internal, hierarchical processes that enable people to put thoughts into actions
through activation and inhibition of decision making processes (Carver and Scheier 1981). Some of
the decision processes take place at a subconscious level and never reach conscious deliberation, a
process called automaticity (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). Thus, there is a dynamic interaction between
people and their environment that is designed for effective behaviour. Models of decision making and
behaviour that incorporate optimal levels of functioning have a long history and a range of
organisational applications. For example, Yerkes and Dodson (1908) introduced an inverted U model
of the association between performance and arousal. More recent models of work performance show
similar patterns: some effort and pressure can be effective, too much of either leads to burnout
(Schaufeli and Bakker 2004). The organisational context must be considered both as an influence on
individual level decision making and as an integral outcome of individual and group decision making
processes. Choices are made at all levels of organisational design that are potentially subject to the
same processes of automaticity, flawed biases and self-regulation as individual decision making.
This recognition that human behaviour is complex and driven by a range of internal and external
factors leads us to question the value of terminology such as ‘error’, ‘slip’ or ‘failure’ within HRA.
Human errors and faults are socially defined events: a perfectly reasonable action to one person may
5 Of course, one might hope that if operators have been subject to many training exercises, then their
responses may be closer to those that would arise from system 2 thinking.
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be an unreasonable failure to another (Hollnagel 2000b). Furthermore, however well judged a
decision may be a priori, it may through ‘ill fortune’ lead to unwanted outcomes. Hence what may
seem an error in hindsight may not be the outcome of irrational or erroneous choice. We should focus
more on human behaviour in individual, group and organisational contexts and recognise its potential
involvement in system failure – without the pejorative judgement of whether that behaviour is
aberrant in any sense. For example, in the Three Mile Island Incident (Commission on the Three Mile
Island Accident 1979) the initiating event – the formation of a hydrogen bubble which forced down
cooling water exposing the core – had not been anticipated in the reactor’s design or safety studies.
The operators not only did not recognise what was happening, but also had never anticipated that it
might. It was an incident beyond their experience and imagination, in a very real sense outside of
scientific and engineering knowledge as it stood then. The operators behaved entirely sensibly and in
accordance with their mental models of what they believed was happening. There was no error in
their behaviour in this respect, not at least in the sense of human error within HRA theory. As we
build and operate more and more complex systems, we should recognise that it is inevitable that we
will encounter unanticipated events and conditions. Risk and reliability analyses need to take account
of human responses to these and, although those responses may indeed lead to untoward outcomes, it
is far from clear that they should be dubbed errors.
4. High reliability organisations
The past 20 years has seen several studies of high reliability organisations (HROs), which Roberts
(1990) defined as organisations failing with catastrophic consequences less than one time in 10,000.
These studies recognise that certain kinds of social organisation are capable of making even
inherently vulnerable technologies reliable enough for a highly demanding society.
An HRO encourages a culture and operating style which emphasises the need for reliability rather than
efficiency (Weick 1987). As organisations, HROs emphasise a culture of learning, although they
clearly do not rely in any sense of learning from mistakes! Instead, HROs resort to learning from
imagination, vicarious experience, stories, simulations and other symbolic representations (Weick
1987). They emphasise a culture of sharing of learning and knowledge, of mental models: ‘heedful
inter-relating’ (Weick and Roberts 1993), ‘collective mindfulness’ (Weick et al. 1999),
‘extraordinarily dense’ patterns of cooperative behaviour (La Porte 1996) and ‘shared situation
awareness’ (Roth et al. 2006). Usually HROs apply a strategy of redundancy (Rochlin et al. 1987)
with teams of operators ‘watching each others backs’. As noted, it is suggested that teams share
common mental models of both their internal organisational processes and the external world
(Mathieu et al. 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al. 2005). Redundancy may increase complexity of operations
as it makes the operations system less easily understood or opaque (Perrow 1984; Sagan 1993).
However, redundancy also increases the probability or chance of getting adequate information to
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solve probable dangers, consequently reducing the risks arising from complexity rather than
increasing them. When necessary, HROs try to decentralise the authority of senior teams or
management responsible for decision making. Rijpma (1997) suggests that HROs use decentralisation
to enable those working closest to any problems to address and solve them as they emerge or become
apparent. Using this method rapid problem solving is achieved, resulting in an increase in reliability
and reduction of the risk of accidents occurring in highly critical situations. This decentralisation may
increase the complexity of the organisation as knowledge and lines of authority need to be distributed,
but La Porte (1996) suggests the balance of these opposing effects can lie in the direction of higher
reliability.
There are several challenges that have been mounted to the HRO line of work. First, some suggest that
HRO perspectives are heavily functionalist and neglect politics and group interests (Perrow 1994;
Sagan 1993, 1994). A second criticism relates to the absence of validation for the empirical studies
underpinning HRO theory (Clarke 1993; Perrow 1994; Sagan 1993). Critics argue that the context of
some of the most important HRO studies, e.g. on the flight decks of aircraft carriers, is misleading,
with evidence of safety only in simulated rather than actual operations. Others argue that the
mechanisms and qualities that are said to underlie the achievement of high reliability are neither
particularly characteristic of HROs nor unequivocally good for reliability. But the HRO work has
given us an insight into the way in which error and failure is managed by social organisations, and
how collective, rather than individual, phenomena like collective mindfulness (Weick et al. 1999) are
what produce reliability in the face of supposedly unreliable individuals and unreliable technologies.
The emphasis of HRA on individuals and on atomised tasks therefore misses the probability that
collective actions and behaviours might lead to or avert system failure.
There would seem to be considerable potential for formative uses of HRA to influence the
development of HRO theory, at least in so far as it can be applied in system and organisational design;
and vice versa, complementing the work of, e.g., Grabrowski and Roberts (1999).
5. Decision contexts
There is a further aspect of context that HRA should consider: decision context. The judgements and
decisions needed of humans in a system can vary from those needed to perform mundane repetitive
operational tasks through more complex circumstances in which information needs to be sought and
evaluated to identify appropriate actions to the ability to react to and deal with unknown and
unanticipated. Decision processes will vary accordingly. Design decisions can inadvertently
introduce further risks to the system that arise from limitations inherent in human foresight. This
means that the appropriate HRA methodology to assess the risks associated with the human decision
making behaviour may vary with the details of that context.
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Cynefin is a conceptual framework developed by
Snowden which, among other things, offers a
categorisation of decision contexts (Snowden
2002; Snowden and Boone 2007). The Cynefin
model roughly divides decision contexts into
four spaces: see Figure 2. In the known space, or
the Realm of Scientific Knowledge, the
relationships between cause and effect are well
understood. All systems and behaviours can be
fully modelled. The consequences of any course
of action can be predicted with near certainty. In
such contexts, decision making tends to take the
form of recognising patterns and responding to
them with well rehearsed actions. Klein (1993) discusses such situations as recognition primed
decision making. In the knowable space, the Realm of Scientific Inquiry, cause and effect
relationships are generally understood, but for any specific decision there is a need to gather and
analyse further data before the consequences of any course of action can be predicted with any
certainty. Decision making can be proceduralised with clear guidance decided a priori. In the
complex space, often called the Realm of Social Systems though such complexity can arise in
environmental, biological and other contexts, decision making situations involve many interacting
causes and effects. Knowledge is at best qualitative: there are simply too many potential interactions
to disentangle particular causes and effects. Before decisions can be made, it is necessary to think
widely, explore issues, frame the problem and develop broad strategies that are flexible enough to
accommodate changes as the situation evolves. Much judgement and expertise will be needed in
making the decision itself. Finally, in the chaotic space, situations involve events and behaviours
beyond our current experience and there are no obvious candidates for cause and effect. Decision
making cannot be based upon analysis because there are no concepts of how separate entities and
predict their interactions. Decision makers will need to take probing actions and see what happens,
until they can make some sort of sense of the situation, gradually drawing the context back into one of
the other spaces. The boundaries between the four spaces should not be taken as hard. The
interpretation is much softer with recognition that there are no clear cut boundaries and, say, some
contexts in the knowable space may well have a minority of characteristics more appropriate to the
complex space.
The Cynefin framework provides a structure in which to articulate some concerns about the use if
HRA in risk and reliability analysis and in relation to HRO studies.
Cause and effect can
be determined with
sufficient data
Knowable
The Realm of
Scientific Inquiry
Complex
The Realm of Social Systems
Cause and effect may be
determined after the event
Chaotic
Cause and effect
not discernable
Known
The Realm of Scientific
Knowledge
Cause and effect understood
and predicable
Figure 2: Cynefin
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 First generation HRA methodologies and arguably most of second and third generation ones focus
on repetitive, operational tasks that lie in the known or, perhaps, knowable spaces. Yet many of
the perceived risks in modern systems arise because of their inherent complexity (Perrow 1984,
1994). In other words, we need be concerned with human behaviour as managers and operators
strive to deal with events happening in the complex or even chaotic spaces. The Chernobyl
Accident was initially managed as if it were in the known and knowable spaces, yet it was one of
the most complex socio-technical accidents that have occurred (French and Niculae 2005). In the
Three Mile Island Accident initially there was no conceptual understanding of the processes by
which a hydrogen bubble might form and hence decision making in the first hours and days of
handling the incident took place in the chaotic space.
 It is informative to read HRO studies from the perspective of Cynefin. For instance, Weick’s
(1987) discussion moves from discussions of how air traffic controllers manage flights in a highly
reliable way – a repetitive task in the known/knowable spaces – and uses these to discuss how
teams might react to complex events such as Bhopal, the decision to launch Challenger and the
Three Mile Island Accident. It is far from clear that organisational practices that enable repetitive,
intrinsically dangerous operations to be carried out safely can be used to develop organisational
preparedness dealing with complex situations that bring many risks, some quite unanticipated.
(For discussions of the tension between operational risk management practice, and incident
preparedness and management, see, e.g., Jalba et al. 2009; Pollard et al. 2009).
The appropriateness of any HRA methodology may depend on the context that is being assessed. As
is the case with all risk methodologies, the characteristics of the risk and the availability of data to
support the application of specific tools and techniques has a forceful influence on their feasible use.
Are we considering a repetitive task that an operator performs in the normal course of events? In this
case we need modelling approaches that fit with behaviours in the known domain. Or are we looking
at the response of an operator to something unexpected that may herald an unanticipated departure of
the system from its normal operating characteristics? In this case we need modelling behaviours for
the knowable, complex or even chaotic domain. For repetitive events the key contextual pressures on
operators that may modify their behaviour are likely to relate to complacency and organisational
issues such as excessive workloads or requirements to work at the same task too long. External
pressures and distractions such family problems or a national sporting event are more likely to affect
behaviour in repetitive normal operations than in responding to the unexpected. In responding to
events ranging from an indication of departure from normal operations to a full blown crisis,
adrenaline, the importance of the matter, as well as cognitive interest are likely to focus the mind. So
the operators’ performance is more likely to be affected by issues such as cognitive overload,
miscommunication between several operations and a range of behaviours that we commonly call
panic! Organisational contexts that affect the operators’ responses relate to, inter alia, the provision
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of training, including emergency simulations in a variety of scenarios, and the establishment of
common mental models among response teams and, more generally, of supportive team behaviours.
Our contention is that the variety of tasks that HRA is called upon to perform and the range of contexts
in which it is applied are so great that it would be optimistic in the extreme to expect one
methodology to be sufficient to meet these requirements. Hollnagel (1998) recognised this, though
his suggestion of two methods probably does not take us much further forward, particularly as his
basic method is more of a screening method for his extended approach rather than appropriate to a
different set of circumstances. What we believe is needed is a portfolio of HRA methods. The
characteristics of each need to be well understood so that we can determine the appropriate contexts
for its application and appreciate its accuracy. It is also important to work out a way of integrating
them so that we do not perpetuate the fallacy of thinking tasks can be divided up and broken down,
and methods can be selected in isolation.
6. Toward an extended model of HRA
Summative HRA and related approaches emphasise quantification and prediction. While cognitive
understanding of people and cultural perspectives on organisations are acknowledged, the gulf
between these and quantitative risk models is generally considered too significant to be bridged. Yet
the conjoining of these approaches could yield a superior model of safety critical organisations and
the people working within them. In the short term, exploring the interfaces between HRA and
behavioural, organisational and related studies is likely to benefit formative analyses to support the
design and operation of complex systems. The barriers to the quantification needed in summative
analyses are currently too substantial – we do not have sufficiently developed and validated models of
behaviour and organisations to provide the precision needed. Moreover, progress in improving and
developing quantitative HRA methods is likely to proceed most quickly in relation to tasks and
activities falling in the known and, perhaps, knowable Cynefin spaces. Successful quantitative
modelling of such tasks and activities depends on having sufficient data to develop and validate
models. For systems that are long established or straightforward developments thereof, we are likely
to have useful data. For novel systems we might generate such data by involving operators in
simulations of component tasks and activities in known and knowable spaces.  Ĉepin (2008) has 
suggested as much, though without the language of Cynefin.  Ĉepin’s modelling, as might be 
expected from our discussion, is focused on probabilistic assessments of errors of omission and
commission. His proposed development focuses on manufactured situations with tight parameters.
While additional data gathered within such a paradigm would add considerable utility to HRA models,
there remains the issue of scope. The approach cannot be easily extended to tasks and activities in the
other spaces. By definition, in the complex space we have neither sufficient qualitative understanding
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nor relevant data to develop quantitative HRA models that predict individual, group and organisational
human behaviour and how these may impact overall system reliability and safety.
Thus we believe that the dominant HRA paradigm, suited as it is for the known and knowable spaces,
needs to be complemented by paradigms developed specifically for the complex space. In achieving
this, we will need to move away from many systems engineering approaches in which hazards are
purportedly designed out of a system. Complex systems involve some human activity if only in their
design and hence are susceptible to some risk arising from human behaviour. Such systems
engineering approaches may work in the known or knowable spaces – and there the question is moot.
Even the simplest systems in the known space need to be designed and that is a human activity.
Moreover the risk homeostasis model suggests that there can be an over-reliance the safety promised
by the system and a concomitant increase in overall risk. But in the complex space, we have no such
hopes that current approaches can design hazards out of the system.
It will not be easy to develop models for new HRA paradigms suitable for the complex space. For
instance, organisational behavioural studies can be useful in identifying the individual, cultural and
organisational factors relevant to system safety; but they do not lend themselves to simple
quantification; indeed, it is the very nature of the complex space that quantification is difficult if not
impossible on current knowledge. We are also limited both by the availability of data from real
incidents and from the generalisability of laboratory based studies. Some commentators, notably Le
Coze (2005), consider the question of whether current forms of organisations can lend themselves to
effective modelling. Furthermore, linear models of cause and effect cannot be simply applied (Morin
1977). Le Coze provides a useful analysis of organisational theories, and their limitations. He
proposes that approaches from complexity theory6 (Morin and Lemoigne 1999; Prigogine 1994;
Simon 1996) could assist in integrating methodologies. One of the contributions of complexity theory
is the guiding philosophy that complex problems cannot be meaningfully decomposed and retain
utility since the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Le Coze concludes by emphasizing the need
for holistic approaches to organisations with additional data from both organisational events and
empirical studies.
Another family of approaches that might lead to a broadened conceptualisation of HRA in the complex
space are the socio-technical (Mumford 2000). For instance, Reiman and Oedewald (2007) propose
that safe and effective organisations can arise only when there is integration of organisational culture
and organisational activities. Their model includes a range of qualitative and quantitative methods
designed to elicit descriptions of the cultural features and the organisational core tasks resulting in a
6 There are differences between complexity theory and Snowdon’s notion of the complex space in Cynefin,
but there are also similarities and these link Le Coze’s and our arguments.
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thorough understanding of alternative ways to approach organisational thinking, strengths and
weaknesses of practices and opportunities to create dialogue regarding the effectiveness of work.
Reiman and Oedewald’s paper represents a useful contribution to the development of the field of
socio-technical systems and their potential links with more quantitative approaches to error and risk.
What they do not encompass are individual approaches to understanding organisational behaviour.
Their work represents another step in the right direction but there is a long way to go before human
activities and behaviours in complex space can be modelled sufficiently for quantitative HRA.
None of the above addresses activities and behaviours which might arise if through some
unanticipated event the system ‘moves into’ the chaotic space: e.g. the unanticipated formation of a
hydrogen bubble in the Three Mile Island Incident (Commission on the Three Mile Island Accident
1979; Niculae 2005). By definition these characteristics cannot be represented in a model – certainly
not in anything other than a schematic manner – simply because the chaotic space represents that part
of our environment that we do not understand yet and so cannot predict.
So to take stock: current quantitative HRA methodologies seem applicable to behaviours and activities
in the known and knowable spaces. There are the barest hints of how some quantitative models might
be developed to predict the impacts of human activities and behaviours in the complex spaces; and, by
definition, it is logically inconceivable that we can develop quantitative models for the chaotic space.
Thus it is not currently possible to perform summative risk and reliability analyses for any system in
which human behaviour and activity can enter the complex or chaotic spaces. Governments and
regulators should be concerned because this accounts for the majority of the technological systems
currently being operated and commissioned. This does not mean that they are unreliable or unsafe;
only that we cannot assure their reliability or safety to within some negligibly small probability. But
there are ways forward.
Firstly and most immediately, we can look to formative uses of HRA, the behavioural and
organisational sciences and many other related disciplines to inform the design of organisational and
management structures and the establishment of appropriate safety cultures to improve the systems
that we have and are designing. This will not be easy because the imperatives that drive this approach
fly in the face of the dominant reductionist thinking in risk and reliability communities. One cannot
simply decompose systems into smaller subsystems, focus on these in turn and expect these to
represent the total system, because culture, organisational structures and other drivers of human
behaviour correlate actions, judgements and decision making in the different subsystems. Modern
perspectives on risk demand a systemic rather than an atomised perspective of the technical, human
and organisational features of systems. Further, because many systems have shared, and arguably,
often fragmented responsibilities for management and risk management (e.g. flood defence, social
care, biosecurity in the food chain), one needs to take a more holistic perspective. The
conceptualisation offered by Cynefin may again give us a way forward. The simple visual
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categorisation of different decision contexts has proven very successful in one of the author’s
experiences in helping in problem formulation and issue structuring (Franco et al. 2006, 2007;
Mingers and Rosenhead 2004; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001). The managers who decide on the
choice of managerial system, its components and operational processes could map these onto a
Cynefin diagram. The discussions and deliberations that would occur as they undertook this would
naturally surface many issues that their design and management decisions would need to address. In
other words, we propose a careful use and reflection upon a Cynefin mapping would augment current
hazard identification procedures and make clearer some of the issues relating to human behaviour that
management will face in operating the system. When they identify that issue although important lies
in the known or knowable space they can look to current HRA – or, preferably, somewhat enhanced –
models to guide their thinking and planning. But when discussion identifies an issue as lying in the
complex space then they will to rely much more on judgement and put into place management
processes that can deal with behaviours more subtly than seeking to police against ‘slips, errors, and
omissions’.
We also believe that in time it will be possible to develop better quantitative HRA methodologies to
give wider assurance at the summative level. But it is unlikely that this will lead to single
methodology. Rather we will need a multi-faceted approach that combines empirically validated HRA
models for the known and knowable spaces with more judgementally based methods for the complex
space. The Cynefin model suggests a broad framework with which to categorise the human tasks and
activities in system to determine which form of HRA modelling would be most appropriate; but it is
only a broad framework. To develop this methodology it will probably need extending to recognise,
among other things:
 whether the human behaviours and activities take place at the individual, group, organisational
level;
 the wider organisational context – including strategic and economic imperatives – in which the
teams and local management structures are embedded;
 the team and local management structures which set the local context in which the operators work;
 the cultural context and – including misplaced trust in other safety barriers in the system – in
which the operators find themselves;
 external influences, particularly those arising from larger external and societal pressures;
 the historical context, including perhaps the lack of recent incidents leading to a growth of
complacency.
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In Adhikari et al.(2008) we outline a programme of research and benchmarking that may help us
develop such a multi-faceted portfolio of HRA methodologies that may eventually provide much
better summative guidance on the risks inherent in complex systems.
None of this will be easy and it will only be possible if we can break the current mechanistic
paradigms that permeate the risk and reliability communities. We need to move on from the Swiss
Cheese model.
7. Conclusion: a message for managers
The key point that we have been trying to convey in this paper is the current dislocation between the
mechanistic reductionist assumptions on which current HRA methodologies are primarily built and
our current understandings of human and organisational behaviour. We must bring these into better
register. Managers, regulators, politicians and the public need to beware of this lest they believe the
numbers that are sometimes touted about the safety of our systems. This should not be read as a
manifesto for Luddism. We are not against the development of more and more complex systems,
providing that they bring benefits, of course. Nor are we against risk per se. Rather we are concerned
at the prevalence of overconfidence in our ability to assess the risks that arise from human behaviour.
We need to take the numbers with that ‘pinch of salt’, recognising that when we build complex
systems our uncertainty is greater than the raw numbers suggest and we need to monitor and watch for
the unanticipated. As is often the case with the application of risk and reliability tools, the valuable
insight comes from a systemic and often qualitative understanding of which systems features ‘drive’
the risk, rather than from the risk estimates per se.
We in the research community have much to do. But so does the management community. It is too
easy to trust the assurances of current risk and reliability analyses which promise that the chance of an
untoward event is small, to believe in the cumulative effect of ‘independent’ safety barriers and to
manage the subsystems separately unaware of the interconnections between them that organisational
culture and human behaviour bring. Human reliability has too long been treated as something that
relates to individuals. It needs to be seen and managed at the organisational level. The key question
is not how likely is an individual’s behaviour is to impact a system, but how well the organisational
structures around and within that system enable the system to run safely and reliability, and how well
they will recover if an untoward event threatens or happens.
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